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The Internet is one of the most important technological advances of the
twentieth century. Starting out as a decentralized system of military
communication created by the U.S. Department of Defense,' it has become a
conduit for over $200 million in commerce.4 The Internet has the potential to
produce several billion dollars in commerce by the turn of the century,'
particularly in the fields of electronic banking, consumer products, computer
software, electronic advertising, and financial investment.6 Approximately 40
million people can currently access the Internet, and the figure is expected to
grow to 200 million by 1999.' This potential for growth and commercial gain
will be facilitated only if there is a predictable legal environment regulating the
Internet, one which gives users notice of applicable laws and allows them to
structure their transactions accordingly
In order to achieve such predictability, one of the most important and
fundamental legal issues that must be resolved is personal jurisdiction. Without
predictable and fair doctrines of personal jurisdiction, merchants will not know
where they will be held liable, and consequently which substantive laws and
1. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.), reconsideration denied, 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D.
Mo. 1996).
2. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
3. Id. at 831.
4. Steven M. Weinberg, Multimedia Business and Law in the Age of New Media,
467 PLI/Pat 95, 119 (1997).
5. 1d.
6. David Bender, Emerging Personal Jurisdictional Issues on the Internet, 453
PLI/Pat 7, 18 (1996). See generally Patrick F. McGowan, The Internet and Intellectual
Property Issues, 455 PLI/Pat 303 (1996).
7. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
8. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 119.
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rules they must obey. Therefore, it is essential that courts establish a predictable
and fair system of Internet-based personal jurisdiction.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
CyberGold, Inc. (hereinafter CyberGold) maintains an Internet site on the
World Wide Web.9 The site can be accessed by any Internet user.' CyberGold's
website provides information about its upcoming service." The website explains
that CyberGold's upcoming service will maintain a mailing list of its customers,
provide each of these customers with an electronic mailbox, and forward to each
customer selected advertisements which match the individual customer's selected
interests.'
Maritz, Inc. (hereinafter Maritz) filed suit against CyberGold in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, 3 seeking preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief, as well as damages. 4 Maritz asserted that
CyberGold had violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a),
by unfairly competing and infringing on Maritz's trademark. 5 CyberGold
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 6 asserting that its only
contact with Missouri-operation of a website accessible by Missouri
citizens-did not establish the minimum contacts necessary to confer personal
jurisdiction over CyberGold in Missouri."
9. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo.),
reconsideration denied, 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
10. Id The court presumed that the server for the website was located in Berkeley,
California. Id. In addition the court found that there were 12,000 Missourians who had
access to the Internet. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id
13. Id, at 1328.
14. Maritz also requested and received an expedited hearing on the motion for a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 1329. The motion for preliminary injunction is reported
and denied in Maritz, Inc., v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
15. Maritz, Inc., v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1329 (E.D. Mo.),
reconsideration denied, 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
16. Id. The motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was brought
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). Because Maritz requested an expedited hearing on
the preliminary injunction, the court ordered an expedited hearing to determine
"threshold jurisdictional questions." Id. CyberGold also brought motions to dismiss for
improper venue, failure to state a claim, and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but all
three were denied. Id at 1334-37. CyberGold's motion to stay the proceeding was also
denied. Id. at 1336-7.
17. Id. at 1329.
[Vol. 62
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In response to CyberGold's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, Maritz asserted two theories which supported the position that the
court had personal jurisdiction over CyberGold. First, Maritz contended that
CyberGold's website invited Missourians to sign on to CyberGold's mailing list
and learn more about CyberGold's upcoming service, and that CyberGold was
"actively soliciting advertising customers from Missouri."'8 Maritz asserted that
this solicitation was also demonstrated by CyberGold's 131 individual contacts
with Missouri customers.19 Second, Maritz contended that CyberGold's alleged
Lanham Act violation caused economic harm to Maritz in Missouri.2"
The Court held that CyberGold's contact with Missouri satisfied both the
statutory2' and constitutional22 requirements necessary to establish personal
jurisdiction in Missouri, and denied CyberGold's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.' The court subsequently denied a motion for
reconsideration of the personal jurisdiction issue.24
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Brief Introduction to the Internet
A network consists of two or more computers linked together to share
information.25 The Interet is essentially a massive network of these smaller
networks and individual computers.26 An Internet user can access information
stored on other computers linked to the Internet regardless of the physical
location of the computer. These computers are linked to the Internet via
telephone lines.27 There are an estimated 40 million users of the Internet, and
18. Id. at 1330.
19. Id. at 1333. The court did not take into account the 180 times that plaintiff
contacted the defendant's website, as the court stated that this would allow plaintiffs to
create personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1333 n.4.
20. Maritz, Inc., v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (E.D. Mo.),
reconsideration denied, 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1332-34.
23. Id. at 1337.
24. Maritz, Inc., v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338, 1344 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
25. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1379 n.1 (E.D. Mich 1995).
26. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Reno provides an
excellent explanation of the history, structure, and uses of the Internet. Id. at 830-43.
27. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo.),
reconsideration denied, 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
1997]
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roughly 9,400,000 computers which have access to the Internet.28 No single
entity controls the Internet.29
The Internet's possible uses are wide and varied. Many use the
"information superhighway" to shop for services, keep updated information on
their financial portfolios, send e-mail, and conduct general searches to retrieve
information." Probably the most well known source of information on the
Internet is the World Wide Web, consisting of a series of documents stored in
different computers linked to the Internet.3 Many companies, governments, and
private organizations have "published" information on their "websites" on the
Internet. 2 A user then contacts the desired website, and the information is
transmitted electronically to the user's computer, where it can be stored to a disk
and printed.
B. Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
In cases where a defendant has neither consented to suit nor is present in the
attempted forum state, the Supreme Court recognizes two types of personal
jurisdiction: general and specific.33 General jurisdiction arises when the
defendants contacts with the forum state are so systematic and continuous that
it is permissible to bring suit against the defendant for a cause of action unrelated
to the contact.34 The application of general jurisdiction doctrines to cases
involving the Internet and on-line services is unlikely to effectuate major legal
change.35 Several courts have held that Internet contact is insufficient to confer
28. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
29. Id. at 832.
30. Id. at 834.
31. Id. at 835-36. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberliability, 446 PLI/Pat 173, 184-
194 (1996) (detailed explanation of the World Wide Web). See also HENRY H. PERRITr,
JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 9-11 (1996); Jeffrey A. Joseph, The
Law at your Fingertips: Practical Applications of the law on the Internet, 18 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 53 (1996).
32. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo.),
reconsideration denied, 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996). See also Weinberg, supra
note 4;at 97 (there were 30 million people connected to the Internet and 90,000 websites
in 1996).
33. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). For
a general analysis of personal jurisdiction see JACK H. FRIENDENTHAL Er AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE 93-190 (2d ed. 1993).
34. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.9.
35.. Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework
for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in this New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REV.
1083, 1117 (1996) ("[G]eneral jurisdiction analysis should not be impacted by the
technological medium from which the suit arises.").
[Vol. 62
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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET
general jurisdiction, as any other result would allow virtually any user of the
Internet to be sued anywhere. 6
The application of specific jurisdiction doctrines to Internet activity,
however, does and will present many novel issues. 7 Specific jurisdiction is
found when the defendant's contact with the forum state is sporadic, but the
cause of action arises out of the contact. 8 In order for a court to assert specific
jurisdiction, the forum state's long-arm statute must authorize jurisdiction over
the activity of the defendant, and the constitutional requirements of due process
must be satisfied.39 Generally courts first determine whether an act falls within
the scope of a long-arm statute, and then determine whether the constitutional
requirements have been met. However, many such state statutes confer
jurisdiction to the limits of the Constitution, and therefore, both statutory and
constitutional issues are determined in the same analysis."
Assuming that a state's long-arm statute is satisfied, or authorizes
jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Constitution, a court must then
determine whether the assertion of specific personal jurisdiction comports with
36. See IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., Nos. 95 C 1204, 95 C 1212, 1997
WL 7286, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 1997) ("Plaintiffs ask this court to hold that any
defendant who advertises nationally or on the Internet is subject to its jurisdiction. It
cannot plausibly be argued that any defendant who advertises nationally could expect to
be haled into court in any state, for a cause of action that does not relate to the
advertisements. Such general advertising is not the type of purposeful activity related to
the forum that would make the exercise ofjurisdiction fair, just or reasonable."); Naxos
Resources Ltd. v. Southam Inc., No. CV 96-2314, 1996 WL 662451, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 16, 1996) (publication of an article on the Internet was insufficient to establish
general jurisdiction as this logic would make a defendant "vulnerable to lawsuits in every
state even for activities unrelated to the state"); McDonough v. Fallon McElligott,Inc.,
No. CIV. 95-4037, 1996 WL 753991, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) ("Plaintiff has
alleged that Fallon maintains a World Wide Web ("Web") site. Because the Web enables
easy world-wide access, allowing computer interaction via the web to supply sufficient
contacts to establish jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement
as it currently exists; the Court is not willing to take this step. Thus, the fact that Fallon
has a Web site used by Californians cannot establish jurisdiction by itself."); California
Software Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1360 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
("The mere act of transmitting information through use of interstate communication
facilities is not, however, sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the sender."); Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1120 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Panavision
Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 620 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
37. See Counts, supra note 35 at 1116-32 (comparing the jurisdictional analysis
in libel cases to Internet cases).
38. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
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due process.4! ' Due process requires that there be minimum contacts between the
defendant and the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."42
In a famous line of cases stemming from International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington, the Supreme Court delineated several major factors used to
determine whether a defendant's contacts with a forum satisfy due process.
Foremost, the defendant must reach out and purposefully avail itself of the
privileges of conducting activities in the forum state.43 This purposeful conduct
within the forum state must be such that a defendant could reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there." The due process requirement of purposeful
availment is designed primarily to protect an individual's liberty interest in not
being bound by judgments in a forum in which the defendant has little or no
contact.45 Purposeful availment accomplishes this protection by instilling
predictability into personal jurisdiction law so that people have the ability to
prepare for liability, or structure their activities so they are not amenable to suit
in a particular forum.46 While a single transaction in a forum can be the basis for
personal jurisdiction,47 contact is not sufficiently foreseeable if it is the result of
the unilateral activity of a third party.48 The court's focus is upon "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."49
Assuming that the court finds minimum contact resulting from the
defendant's purposeful availment to the forum state, due process also requires
that the assertion be reasonable in light of five major fairness factors: (1) the
burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in the dispute; (3) the
plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining a fair result; and (5) the shared interest of
the several states in furthering fundamental substantive policies.5"
41. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
42. Id. at 316.
43. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
44. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
45. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985). The
purposeful availment requirement ensures that defendants are not haled into ajurisdiction
based upon fortuitous or random contact, or the unilateral actions of third parties. Id. at
475.
46. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297.
47. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
48. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286.
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C. Application of Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
to Internet and On-Line "Contacts"
Some scholars assert that the current personal jurisdiction doctrines are not
capable of being adapted to the Internet, and recommend legislative reform of
Internet jurisdiction.5' In contrast, several commentators find that the flexible
doctrines of personal jurisdiction set out in International Shoe and its progeny
are capable of adaptation to the Internet.52 In any event, special legislation
currently does not exist, and courts have begun to adapt existing personal
jurisdiction doctrines to Internet contacts. To date, the courts generally have
dealt with Internet or on-line contacts in three different contexts: (1) advertising;
(2) contacts related to contractual agreements; and (3) contact that is allegedly
tortious.
The courts have split on the issue of whether Internet advertising is
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over an out of state defendant. 3 In Inset
Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.," the court found that personal jurisdiction
existed over a Massachusetts corporation in a suit brought for trademark
infringement.55 Even though the defendant did not maintain an office or have a
51. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). The authors assert that traditional personal
jurisdiction theory which is based upon physical presence and geography is inapplicable
to the Internet because users of the Internet do not have notice of the location of their
contacts, and no one jurisdiction has more legitimate control over Internet activity than
another. Id. at 1371-76. See also Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L.
REv. 1095, 1107-23 (1996) (asserting that current physical presence based personal
jurisdiction ideas are inapplicable to the Internet, and are unworkable since they
effectively subject an Internet user to unlimited jurisdiction). See generally William S.
Byassee Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual
Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 197 (1995).
52. See Richard S. Zembek, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental
Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339, 353-79
(1996) (asserting that Internet activity is a form of communication which cannot be
separated from the physical world, and that current doctrines of personal jurisdiction used
to decide advertisement, telephone, and environmental cases are the proper paradigms
to apply to Intemetjurisdiction questions). See generally Counts, supra note 35, at 1117-
32; Dale M. Cendali & James D. Arbogast, 'Net Use Raises Issues of Jurisdiction,
'Minimum Contacts' Rules Can Subject Internet Users to Lawsuits in Faraway Forums,
19 NAT'L L.J. 9 (1996).
53. For a general analysis of how personal jurisdiction doctrines have been applied
to Internet advertising see Lori Irish Bauman, Personal Jurisdiction and Internet
Advertising, 14 NO. 1 Computer Law. 1 (1997).
54. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
55. Inset alleged that Instruction Set infringed upon its trademark, "Inset," by using
1997]
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sales force in Connecticut, the court found the defendant's use of an Internet
website for advertising satisfied the minimum contact necessary to establish
personal jurisdiction. 6 The court held that the defendant purposefully availed
itself of the laws of Connecticut through its Internet advertising because the
advertising was directed to citizens of all the states, including the roughly 10,000
Connecticut users of the Internet." The court also found that this Internet
advertising was more purposeful than standard radio or television advertising
because once posted, it was available continuously to any Internet user. 8
In Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation,59 the court held that personal
jurisdiction existed over the defendant in an action alleging trademark
infringement.' The court held that the defendant's placement of an
advertisement in a local paper as well as the use of an Internet website that was
continuously accessible to District residents provided enough contact to show
purposeful availment of District of Columbia law.6'
In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,62 the court held that it lacked
personal jurisdiction over King in an action alleging trademark infringement.63
The court found that King's act-creating a website accessible from New York
which advertised King's Missouri music club-was not sufficient to find that
King purposefully availed himself of New York law.' Rather, the court required
more deliberative activities, such as actively seeking out New York customers
and attempting to entice New York customers to access the site and attend events
at the Missouri club.65
"Inset.com" as its Internet address. Id. at 163.
56. Id. at 165.
57. Id. For a criticism of the Connecticut court's holding on this issue see Burk,
supra note 51, at 1111 n.70 (stating that the purposeful availment standard expressed by
the Inset court is too broad, and that under the Inset court's reasoning all 450,000
websites on the Internet "have purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing
business in Connecticut-even if they have never heard of Connecticut").
58. Id.
59. No. 96-1260, 1996 WL 787411 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1996).
60. Id. at*1.
61. Id. at *4. The court also noted that the defendant's website "explicitly solicits
contributions, and provides a toll-free telephone number for that purpose" as well as
containing the allegedly infringing trademark. Id. at *4.
62. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir.
Sept. 10, 1997).
63. Id. at 300-01.
64. Id. at301.
65. Id. at 299. The court stressed the practical difficulties New York residents
would encounter in their efforts to use the information on the website, as the resident who
wished to attend the show would have to telephone ahead to reserve tickets and actually
go to Missouri to retrieve the tickets. Id. at 300-01. The court noted that mere
[Vol. 62
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In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,66 the court found that personal jurisdiction
did not exist over Goldberger in a suit alleging trademark infringement.67 The
court found that Goldberger's creation of a website which advertised future
services was insufficient to show the purposeful availment necessary to confer
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 68 The court reasoned that national
advertisements in other technological forms are not generally sufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction, 9 and that it would be unfair and very detrimental to
Internet communications to find personal jurisdiction in every forum in which
an advertisementon the Internet can be accessed-essentially any forum in the
world.70
In State v. Granite Gate Resorts,7' the court found personaljurisdiction over
a foreign defendant in a criminal action brought to enjoin the defendant from
advertising its on-line gambling service over the Internet in Minnesota. 7' The
foreseeability of in-state consequences, such as trademark confusion or the ability of state
residents to access awebsite, was insufficientto confer personal jurisdiction. Id. at 301.
The court also concluded that "[t]he mere fact that a person can gain information on the
allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent of a person advertising, promoting,
selling or otherwise making an effort to target its product in New York." Id. at 299.
66. No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
67. Id. at *4. The court noted that Goldberger had not yet sold any products or
services. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at *11.
70. Id. at *20 ("Upholdingpersonaljurisdictionover Goldbergerin the present case
would, in effect, create national (or even worldwide) jurisdiction, so that every plaintiff
could sue in plaintiffs home court every out of state defendant who established an
Internetweb site. The Court declines to reach such a far-reaching result in the absence
of a Congressional enactment of Internet specific trademark infringement personal
jurisdiction legislation."). See generally Johnson, supra note 51, at 1376-77 ("It is not
clear that any given country's trademark authorities possess, or should possess,
jurisdiction over such placements. Otherwise, any use of a trademark on the Net would
be subject simultaneouslyto thejurisdiction of every country."); Burk, supra note 51, at
1123 ("The argument that a cybernaut exposes herself to lawsuits in any and every
jurisdictionthat her packets may reach is an argument unsupported by either doctrine or
policy. From a purely doctrinal stand-point, this standard affords Internet users no
meaningful opportunity to 'structure their primary conduct' so as to accept or avoid the
risk of litigation in a given forum-cybernauts cannot 'vote with their feet' if their feet
are in essence planted everywhere. As a matter of policy, the standard would similarly
afford states enormous opportunities for overreaching by imposing their domestic
regulatory costs on out-of-state Internet users.").
71. No. C6-95-7227,1996 WL 767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996), affd, 568
N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). For a critical analysis of this case see Johnson,
supra note 51, at 1374-76.
72. Id at *9. For an analysis of the differences between civil and criminal personal
1997]
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advertisement explained the defendant's gambling service, and listed an 800
number by which customers could register.73 The Minnesota Attorney General
claimed that the ad explicitly and implicitly gave the impression that gambling
was legal in Minnesota, which violated Minnesota consumer protection laws.74
The court found that the use of the ad purposefully availed Granite of Minnesota
law because Granite had knowledge and records of 248 computer "hits" from
Minnesota citizens, and two Minnesota gamblers were included in Granite's list
of top 500 customers.75 The court also denied Granite's arguments that the
contact was due to the unilateral acts of Minnesota residents76 and that it was
unreasonable for Granite to be liable to suit in Minnesota.77
The courts have generally been consistent in their decisions regarding the
issue of whether Internet or on-line contacts related or pursuant to a business
agreement can confer personal jurisdiction. In CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,78
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found personal jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant in a declaratory judgment action brought to settle a trademark
infringement claim.79 The court held that Patterson purposefully availed himself
of Ohio law primarily by subscribing to CompuServe and entering into a contract
whereby Patterson advertised and sold a shareware program using CompuServe's
system-a contract which also stated that Ohio law would be used to settle
disputes 0 In addition, Patterson initiated the cause of action by making
jurisdiction in cases dealing with the Internet see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 35-42 (1996). See also Seth Gorman & Antony Loo,
Blackjack or Bust: Can US. Law Stop Internet Gambling?, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 667,
679-85 (detailed analysis of personal jurisdiction law as applied to Internet gambling).
73. Granite, 1996 WL 767431, at *3. The ad explains that the service requires a
100 dollar set up fee for software. Id. at *4. Once the service is set up the customers
would be required to deposit a minimum of $ 1000 into an account, which is used to pay
the bets. Id.
74. Id. at *5.
75. Id. at *8. In addition, the court noted that "[t]he Defendant's attempt to hide
behind the Internet and claim that they mailed nothing to Minnesota, sent nothing to
Minnesota, and never advertised in Minnesota. This argument is not sound in the age of
cyberspace." Id. at *6. In fact, the court seemed to find this Internet advertising more
purposeful than other forms of advertising because the Internet ads could be accessed 24
hours a day, 365 days a year. Id
76. Id. at *8-*9.
77. Id, at *11. The court found the inconvenience argument asserted by Granite
unconvincing because Granite's ad stated that Granite could sue a customer in the
customer's state or the country of Belize. Id.
78. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th. Cir. 1996).
79. Id. at 1268.
80. Id. at 1266. Notably, the court stated that the issue of whether Internet contacts
were enough to confer personal jurisdiction was a question of first impression in the 6th
[Vol. 62
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/4
PERSONAL JURISDICTIONAND THE 1NTERNET
demands on CompuServe via electronic mail.8 The court found these contacts
purposefully availed Patterson of the forum because he was not simply a
purchaser of services, but rather a provider of software who used CompuServe
to market his product over a three-year period. 2 The court also clearly
expressed that it was not basing its holding of personal jurisdiction on a stream
of commerce theory, 3 on the mere entry into a contract in Ohio,84 or on the fact
that a consumer of a product was the defendant."
In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,6 the court found
personal jurisdiction over Zippo Dot Coin (hereinafter Dot Coin) in a suit
alleging trademark infringement. The court found that Dot Coin's contact with
Pennsylvania involved the operation of a website on which it posted information
about its news service,88 the entry into seven agreements with Internet providers
located in Pennsylvania, and the sale of subscriptions to over 3000 Pennsylvania
subscribers.89 The court found that Dot Com was conducting business over the
Internet in Pennsylvania that went beyond mere advertising,9" and that the
resulting contact in Pennsylvania was not due to the unilateral acts of a third
party contacting Dot Com's website.9'
Circuit. Id. at 1262.
81. Id. at 1266.
82. Id. at 1264. The court noted that this was "crucial" to the case because
"Patterson chose to transmit his software from Texas to CompuServe's system in Ohio,
that myriad others gained access to Patterson's software via that system, and that
Patterson advertised and sold his product through that system." Id.
83. Id. at 1265. Specifically the court stated that it was not deciding whether
Patterson could be sued in any state where his software program was purchased, or where
for example his software caused damage to a computer by transmitting a virus. Id. at
1268. For an analysis of the application of the stream of commerce theory to Internet
contact see Byassee, supra note 51, at 211-12. See also Burk, supra note 51, at 1115-16.
84. CompuServe, Inc. v Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1257, 1265 (6th. Cir. 1996).
85. Id. at 1268 ("Finally, we need not and do not hold that CompuServe may, as
the district court posited, sue any regular subscriber to its service for nonpayment in
Ohio, even if the subscriber is a native Alaskan who has never left home.").
86. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
87. Id. at 1121.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1126.
90. Id. The court found that Zippo had done more than merely post or exchange
information on the Internet through an interactive website. Id.
91. Id. See also Counts, supra note 35, at 1126-29 (asserting that many types of
Internet contact involve a unilateral act by a third party that should eliminate the
purposeful availment of the information provider); Byassee, supra note 51, at 211-13 (in
cyberspace transactions third parties complete the transaction without knowledge of the
dispenser, making the "transportation entirely self service."); See generally Bender, supra
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In Digital Equipment Corp. v. Altavista Technology, Inc.,92 the court held
that personal jurisdiction existed over the defendant in a suit alleging breach of
a trademark licensing agreement' and trademark infringement.94 The court
explained that the defendant's contract with a Massachusetts corporation,"
solicitation of business through its website, and its knowledge that the plaintiff
was located in Massachusetts were sufficient to purposefully avail the defendant
of Massachusetts law. 6 The court noted that there were new personal
jurisdiction issues raised by Internet contacts,97 but that none of these new issues
were present in this case. 8 The court was also careful to state that its decision
did not hold that personal jurisdiction may be found over anyone that operates
a website without pursuing more purposeful activities in the specific forum. 99
In Resuscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp.,I ' the
court held that personal jurisdiction was properly asserted over the defendant in
a declaratory judgment action brought to establish that a contract did not exist.'"I
The court first stated that in order to determine whether particular transactions
note 6, at 53-56.
The courts have not given much credence to the unilateral act theory in criminal
cases as demonstrated by United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,708 (6th. Cir. 1996) and
Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1044
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
92. 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
93. Id. at 459.
94. Id. The court noted that the threshold for purposeful availment for a tort is
lower than business contacts.
95. Digital, 960 F. Supp. at 468. Significantly, the contract contained a choice of
law clause which indicated that Massachusetts law would govern any disputes. Id. at
469.
96. Id. at 464.
97. Id. at 462-63 ("To impose traditional territorial concepts on the commercial
uses of the Internet has dramatic implications, opening the Web user up to inconsistent
regulations throughout fifty states, indeed, throughout the globe. It also raises the
possibility of dramatically chilling what may well be 'the most participatory marketplace
of mass speech that this country - and indeed the world - has yet seen.').
98. Id. at 463.
99. Id. ("[T]his case does not reach the issue of whether any Web activity, by
anyone, absent commercial use, absent advertising and solicitation of both advertising
and sales, absent a contract and sales and other contacts with the forum state, and absent
the potentially foreseeable harm of trademark infringement, would be sufficient to permit
the assertion ofjurisdiction over a foreign defendant.").
100. No. IP 96-1457-C-MIS, 1997 WL 148567 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997).
101. Id. at *6. The plaintiff also brought claims for breach of confidentiality
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over the Internet amount to purposeful availment by a defendant, the "level of
interactivity" and the "commercial nature of the exchange" must be analyzed. 0z
The court found that the defendant's extensive e-mail communications with the
plaintiff and a nonbinding letter of intent, both made in an effort to form a new
corporation with an Indiana citizen, amounted to purposeful availment by the
defendant of Indiana law. 3 The major factor in the courts analysis was that the
proposed corporation would have had a large commercial impact on Indiana."c
In Plus Systems, Inc. v. New England Network, Inc.,05 the Colorado District
Court found that personal jurisdiction existed over a Connecticut corporation in
a declaratory judgment suit alleging breach of contract. 6 One form of contact
the court used to determine the personal jurisdiction issue was the
communication between the parties' computers over telephone lines. 7 The
court found that this computer contact constituted purposeful availment of the
laws of the forum state because the computer contact was the main service
covered in the contract, and the computers providing the service to the defendant
were located in Colorado. 8 While the court ruled that personal jurisdiction
existed in this case, it acknowledged that communication between computers
was a new extension of "contact" in the personal jurisdiction sense. 9
While the above cited cases in the area of Internet contact related to a
business agreement have generally found purposeful availment, one jurisdiction
has not. In Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.,"0 the court upheld
102. Id. at *4.
103. Id. at *5-*6.
104. Id at *4-*5.
105. 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992).
106. Id at 115. Plus Systems provided a computer service which provided banking
customers nationwide access to their accounts through automated teller machines. Id. at
114-15. Plus Systems brought a declaratory judgment action in response to New
England's statement that it would refuse to implement a royalty provision in their
contract. Id. at 115.
107. Id. at 118-19. Other forms of contact analyzed by the court were the contract's
choice of law clause, a monthly payment schedule, and the defendant's sending of a
representative to Colorado to initiate the business dealings. Id. at 118.
108. Id. at 119 ("All of the above enumerated contacts, over the contract's life of
the past five years, convince us that the quality, nature, and frequency of Defendant's
activity show that the Defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum state.").
109. Id. The court stated that prior cases finding contact through telephone
communications "served more as analogy than precedent on the issue of whether
communication between computers similarly constitutes 'contact."' Id at 119 n.3.
110. 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). For a summary of the case and
analysis of the personal jurisdiction issues involved see Michael J. Santisi, Note, Pres-
Kap, Inc., v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.: Extending the Long-Arm Statute Through
the Internet?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 433 (1995).
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the motion of System One, Direct Access, Inc. (hereinafter System One) to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in a case alleging breach of contract."'
System One's only contact with the forum state was the forwarding of rental
payments to Miami, and the use of a computer database located in Florida."2
The court found that this contact was insufficient to show purposeful availment
because none of the underlying contracts meaningful negotiations took place in
the forum state, and because finding a customer of on-line services amenable to
suit in a state simply because the physical computer database was located there
was beyond the expectations of computer users." 3
The courts also have dealt with the issue of whether alleged tortious acts or
statements made over the Internet by an out of state defendant were sufficient to
confer personal jurisdiction in a state where they were received. In one of the
first cases to deal with on-line activity in a jurisdictional sense, California
Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc.,"' a California software seller brought
suit against a Nevada corporation seeking damages for allegedly defamatory
statements placed on a closed computer network." 5 The court applied the
jurisdictional "effects test" used in defamatory publication cases1,6 and found
111. System One, 636 So. 2d at 1352.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1353. The court stated:
Indeed, a contrary decision would, we think, have far-reaching implications
for business and professional people who use 'on-line' computer services for
which payments are made to out-of-state companies where the database is
located. Across the nation, in every state, customers of 'on-line' computer
information networks have contractual arrangements with out-of-state
supplier companies, putting such customers in a situation similar, if not
identical, to the defendant in the instant case. Lawyers, journalists, teachers,
physicians, courts, universities, and business people throughout the country
daily conduct various types of computer-assisted research over telephone
lines linked to supplier databases located in other states. Based on the trial
court's decision below, users of such 'on-line' services could be haled into
court in the state in which supplier's billing office and database happen to be
located, even if such users, as here, are solicited, engaged, and serviced
entirely in state by the supplier's local representatives. Such a result, in our
view, is wildly beyond the reasonable expectations of such computer-
information users, and, accordingly, the result offends the traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.
Id.
114. 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
115. Id. at 1357-59. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's libelous comments
on the network caused the plaintiff to lose customers for one of its software programs.
Id. at 1359.
116. Id. at 1360-61. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), and Keeton v.
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that the on-line defamation conferred specific jurisdiction because it intentionally
influenced third parties to injure the California plaintiff.' " The court also noted
that computer contact in some situations should confer broader jurisdiction than
traditional phone or mail communication." 8
In Edias Software International, L.L.C. v. Basis International, Ltd.," 9 the
United States District Court of Arizona found the defendant subject to personal
jurisdiction based upon the underlying claim of defamation. 20 The court found
that the defendant purposefully availed itself of Arizona law based upon Internet
advertising, an allegedly defamatory message sent to Arizona via e-mail, a
CompuServe webpage, and a forum message.' 2' The Court reasoned that the
defamation was sufficient to show purposeful availment as the messages were
directed at Arizona, the plaintiffs principal place of business, and Arizona was
the forum in which the damage from defamation allegedly took place.
122
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,' the court found that
Toeppen was subject to personal jurisdiction in a case alleging trademark
infringement. 24 The court held that by registering Panavision's trademark name
Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984), for a description of the "effects test" used to
determine whether libelous statements confer jurisdiction in a particular jurisdiction. See
also Counts, supra note 36, at 1121-29 (explaining and advocating a narrow reading of
the effects test in order to provide due process to defendants in Internet libel cases);
Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The First
Amendment in an Online World, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 1137, 1168 (1996) (asserting that
because Internet publishers cannot limit access to their publications, a broad "effects test"
applied to the Internet would have a chilling effect on speech).
117. Id. at 1362-64.
118. Id. at 1363. The court stated that:
Through the use of computers, corporations can now transact business and
communicate with individuals in several states simultaneously. Unlike
communication by mail or telephone, messages sent through computers are
available to the recipient and anyone else who may be watching. Thus, while
modem technology has made nationwide commercial transactions simpler and
more feasible, even for small businesses, it must broaden correspondingly the
permissible scope ofjurisdiction exercisable by the courts.
Id.
119. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
120. Id. at 422.
121. Id. at 420-21. The court held that personal jurisdiction was partially based
upon Basis's contract with Edias, and their business dealings with Edias in Arizona. Id.
at 422.
122. Id. at 420. The court used the "effects test" to determine personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 420 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)).
123. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
124. Id. at 623.
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as his Internet address in the hope of having Panavision "buy" the name back
when Panavision decided to open a website, Toeppen purposefully availed
himself of California law.'25 The court reasoned that Toeppen's alleged use of
the Internet address should be analyzed under a tort theory, 2 6 and that Toeppen
had expressly aimed his tortious conduct at Panavision in California. 27
In Cody v. Ward,2 the court found personal jurisdiction over Ward in a
case alleging that the defendant made fraudulent misrepresentations to the
plaintiff in order to induce the plaintiff to buy stock.'29 The communications
were made initially through a commercial on-line computer service discussion
forum, phone calls, and fifteen e-mail messages directed to the plaintiffs
personal computer'3 0 The court held that the defendant's communications
purposefully availed it of Connecticut law because the nature and number of e-
mail messages and phone calls made it reasonable for the defendant to expect
liability in Connecticut.'3'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,' the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri held that the operation of an Internet website, which
advertised an upcoming service, provided sufficient minimum contacts for the
assertion of specific personal jurisdiction in a federal trademark infringement suit
brought for violation of the Lanham Act.' The court initially stated that its
exercise of personal jurisdiction must be authorized by the Missouri long-arm
statute and consistent with due process.'34
125. Id. at 622.
126. Id at 621. The court classified Toeppen's action as a tort based upon the fact
that Toeppen was not conducting business in California by means of the Internet, but
was instead conducting a "scam." Id. at 622.
127. Id. at 621-22. The court found that the tortious action was directed at the
plaintiff in California under the "effects doctrine." Id. at 621 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783 (1984)).
128. 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn. 1997).
129. Id. at 44.
130. Id.
131. Id at 47. The court specifically noted that it did not take into account the 225
messages posted by the defendant on the commercial service (Prodigy), and stated that
"[i]f it turns out that the plaintiff has to rely on the Prodigy messages to prove causation,
this issue may have to be addressed." Id, at 47 n.8.
132. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.), reconsideration denied, 947 F. Supp. 1338
(E.D. Mo. 1996).
133. Id. at 1330-34.
134. Id. at 1329. The court also explained that since the personal jurisdiction
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First the court concluded that Missouri's long arm statute authorized "the
exercise ofjurisdiction over non-residents to the extent permissible under the due
process clause."'35 The court then discussed the issue of whether CyberGold's
advertising over the Internet authorized long-arm jurisdiction under the
"transaction of business" prong ofthe Missouri long-arm statute.'36 The court
recognized that the issue of whether advertising over the Internet was an activity
that met the "transaction of business" test was one of first impression in
Missouri,'37 and also found that Maritz's analogies to prior decisions construing
advertising under the "transaction of business" test were "to some extent
unsatisfactory."' 38 The court then stated that since the Missouri long-arm statute
conferred jurisdiction to the extent allowed by due process, the court would
determine the "transaction of business" long-arm question in its discussion of
due process authorization.'39
The court then held that it was unnecessary to determine whether
CyberGold's Internet activity fell within the "transaction of business" prong of
the long arm statute because CyberGold's alleged trademark infringement
question was raised pursuant to a 12(b)(2) motion, the court looks at the facts in light
most favorable to the nonmovant, Maritz. Id. The court stated that the burden of proof
was still with the plaintiff, Maritz, seeking to establish personal jurisdiction. Id.
However, the court concluded that since this was an expedited hearing based on
submissions, instead of a full evidentiary hearing, Maritz only needed to establish a
prima facia showing in order to prevail on the motion. Id. at 1329-30.
135. Id at 1330-31. The Missouri Long-Arm Statute's relevant sections state:
1. Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, or any
corporation, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts
enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person, firm, or corporation,
and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any
such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state;
(3) The commission of a tortious act within this state;
Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (1994).
136. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1331.
137. Id.
138. Id. Maritz compared CyberGold's advertisement of CyberGold's service to
active solicitation in Missouri through mass mailing. Id. The court found that Maritz's
analogies were not satisfactory because there were "considerable differences in the two
mediums of communication and information exchange." Id. These differences were
explained in more detail by the court in its discussion of constitutional authorization. See
infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
139. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1331.
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definitely fell within the "commission of a tortious act" prong. 4 The court
recognized that a violation of the Lanham Act is tortious in nature,' 4' and that if
Maritz's alleged trademark infringement claim were valid, the location of
Maritz's'resulting economic harm would be Missouri. 42
Second, the court turned to the due process authorization issue by setting
out the Eighth Circuit's five part test to determine the existence of minimum
contacts sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. 43 The court found that the
first factor, the nature and quality of CyberGold's contact with the forum state,
favored the exercise of personal jurisdiction.' 44
In analyzing the first factor, the court compared the nature and quality of
CyberGold's advertising activity over the Internet to previous cases involving
mail and telephone advertising in order to determine whether CyberGold's
website amounted to "promotional activities or active solicitations such as to
provide the minimum contacts" necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction.'45
The court found that the use of e-mail over the Internet is a more efficient,
quicker, and wider reaching form of communication than traditional mail
solicitation or the use of an 800 telephone number. 46 It determined that while
the nature and quality of CyberGold's contact with Missouri was new, and not
exactly analogous to previous methods of solicitation, the Eighth Circuit's first
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The court noted that two previous Eastern District cases had found a
tortious activity for purposes of the long arm statute, in Missouri where the "sole basis
forjurisdiction was an extraterritorial act of tortious interference with a contract which
produced an effect in the State of Missouri." Id. (citing Peabody Holding Co. v. Costain
Group PLC, 808 F. Supp. 1425, 1433-34 (E.D. Mo. 1995); May Dep't Stores Co. v.
Wilansky, 900 F. Supp. 1154, 1159-60 (E.D. Mo. 1995)). The court noted that
CyberGold's alleged activity fell within these prior cases. Id.
143. Id at 1332 (citing Bell Paper Box, Inc., v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819
(8th Cir. 1994)). The five factors listed were:
(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state;
(2) the quantity of those contacts;
(3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts;
(4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents;
(5) the convenience of the parties.
Id.
144. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
145. Id. at 1332.
146. Id. The court stated that Internet advertising was more efficient than the use
of an 800 telephone number because the 800 number still needed to use separate print
advertising to be effective. Id. In addition, the court stated that Internet sites could
transmit potentially printable information in greater quantities, and more rapidly than
could be done over the phone. Id. at 1332-33.
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factor favored exercise of personal jurisdiction because CyberGold's website
advertising was an active and conscious attempt to reach out to global Internet
users. 47 Therefore the nature and quality of the acts tended to show purposeful
availment of the privileges of the forum state. 48
The court then analyzed the second factor, the quantity of contact with the
forum, and found that this factor also favored the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over CyberGold.' 49 It concluded that CyberGold's 131 transmissions
of advertising information, intended as solicitation for its upcoming service,
were sufficient evidence of purposeful availment. 150
The court then found that the third factor, the relationship between the
litigation and the defendant's contact with the forum state, also favored the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.' It concluded that the upcoming service, as
well as the promotional advertising on the website, were the acts which Maritz
alleged infringed upon its trademark.'52 The court again noted that the issue of
whether sufficient minimum contacts can be established solely by computers and
electronic communication is a new issue under due process jurisprudence,'53 but
emphasized that factors one through three tended to establish that CyberGold
had purposefully availed itself of the laws of Missouri.) 4
The court then analyzed factors four and five, the traditional reasonableness
factors, together.' The court found that the state of Missouri had an interest in
determining whether a Missouri company's trademark was being infringed, that
the plaintiff had a strong interest in having the suit decided in Missouri, and that
the defendant would not be unduly burdened by a suit in Missouri.'56
Based upon its analysis of the five factors necessary to assert specific
personal jurisdiction in the Eighth Circuit, and its interpretation of the Missouri
long-arm statute, the court determined that personal jurisdiction over CyberGold
was properly asserted, and denied the defendant's 12(b)(2) motion for
dismissal.'57 The court subsequently denied CyberGold's motion for rehearing. 58






153. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
154. Id. at 1333-34.
155. Id. at 1334.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1337.
158. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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V. COMMENT
A. The Individual Holding of Maritz
Maritz v. CyberGold 9 is the first case in the Eighth Circuit to apply the
traditional personal jurisdiction doctrines to the novel area of Internet contact. 60
The Maritz court's balancing between liberal and conservative applications of
personal jurisdiction provides a solid model to be followed by future courts.'I'
CyberGold's contact with Missouri consisted of its Internet advertisement and
131 individualized contacts with potential Missouri customers over the
Internet 62 While the actual delivery of services to Missouri had not begun, the
court determined that the nature of the contact was tortious, and that there was
a close connection between the contact and the suit. 63 Because these facts
demonstrated that CyberGold knew with whom it was dealing, knew where these
potential customers were located, and attempted to gain the benefit of doing
business in Missouri, the Maritz court's finding of purposeful availment of
Missouri law was correct. 1
B. Principles Courts ShouldApply When Determining Personal
Jurisdiction Based Upon Internet Contact
Because the Internet allows for instant and inexpensive worldwide
communication, it presents many new personal jurisdiction policy issues. If a
broad interpretation of purposeful availment is applied to Internet activity,
several concerns are raised. Some argue that since all operators know it is
possible for anyone in the world to access their site, operation of a website could
purposefully avail the defendant of any forum in which the message can be
received-essentially any forum in the world. 6 This then would subject the
159. MaritZ, Inc. v. CyberGold Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.),
reconsideration denied, 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
160. Id. at 1332. In addition, the Maritz court noted that its decisions regarding
jurisdiction and the Missouri Long arm statute were also of first impression. Id. at 1331.
161. For a discussion of the liberal and conservative views of Internet personal
jurisdiction, compare Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn.
1996), to Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd,
No. 1383, 1997 WL 60048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997), andHearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No.
96 CIV. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
162. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
163. Id. at 1331-33.
164. See infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of why these
factors should determine Internet personal jurisdiction.
165. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
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operators to the possibly inconsistent laws of every state.'" In addition, this
massive liability brought on by conflicting applicable law could chill free speech
and the rapidly expanding field of Internet commerce.'67
There are equally troubling issues raised by a narrow interpretation of
personal jurisdiction doctrines as applied to Internet communication. IfInternet
contact is not considered to purposefully avail the defendant of the forum,
businesses potentially would have the ability to shield their transactions from the
laws of a state simply by conducting their business over the Internet. 6 In order
to reach a comprehensive theory of personal jurisdiction for Internet activities,
these differing policy concerns raised by this new technology must be balanced.
This balancing was exactly what International Shoe's69 flexible personal
availment standard was designed to accomplish.
Courts attempting to balance these policy concerns should look primarily
to the issue of whether or not the defendant knew where, and by whom, the
defendant's Internet information would be received. Following this logic, if
there is extensive business contact by a defendant in the forum through the
Internet, then personal jurisdiction would generally be established, as it would
be if a different method of contact were involved. General notice or
foreseeability concerns are satisfied as the defendants know with whom they are
dealing, where the party is located, and often have signed contracts and entered
into sales in the forums asserting jurisdiction. 7 °
In addition, it is precisely in this type of transaction that it would be unfair
to allow businesses to shield their sales and contact in the forum because of the
choice to use the Internet. Internet transactions and advertising often are more
effective than other forms of advertisement or business, in that they can target
nationwide groups and are continuously accessible.' It seems logical that if
Internet technology gives an entrepreneur the ability to reach a broader market,
then liability in these markets would also increase, not decrease. In essence,
Interet users must take the bitter with the sweet; if they are going to reach out
to, and benefit from, distant markets by using a superior form of communication
and advertising, then these users should be subject to the applicable laws of that
jurisdiction.
1996).
166. See Burk, supra note 51.
167. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 463 (D. Mass.
1997).
168. Id. at471.
169. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
170. See supra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
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In addition to this knowledge of who is receiving information, jurisdiction
should not be found unless the defendant truly gains the benefit of the forum
state. Where the defendant has no interest and does not conduct business with
people in a distant forum, the defendant should not be held amenable to suit
simply because the defendant's information can be accessed in the distant
forum. 72 The mere fact that the information is accessible everywhere is one of
the unique features of the Internet. There must be some level of benefit gained
from the contact in the forum state before this accessibility turns into purposeful
availment, otherwise people will be forced to choose between not using the
Internet or subjecting themselves to suit in every state.'73 The potential value of
Internet business is so great that its use should not be chilled by an inability to
structure Internet contact to avoid amenability to suit in distant forums.
In addition, courts should closely analyze the underlying claim. In certain
areas, such as defamation and other tortious conduct, the ability of Internet
contacts to be instantaneous and far reaching should cause the courts to exercise
jurisdiction wherever the harm is caused. 74 If a user meets the publication tests
applicable in other forms of media, and is simply trying to hide behind
technology, then purposeful availment should be found.
C. Advice for Structuring Internet Acitivity
Maritz and the other cases in this area provide substantial guidance to
practitioners on issues of Internet jurisdiction. The cases which have decided
issues of specific personal jurisdiction based upon Internet contact indicate that
the likelihood of a defendant purposefully availing itself of a forum through use
of the Internet increases as the communication becomes more interactive. 175 If
the communications are very interactive, then theoretically the defendant would
know with whom and where its communications are taking place.
The cases which have involved formal business relationships are the cases
where purposeful availment was most often found by the courts.176 The
172. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
affld, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,
No. 96 Civ 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
173. See Burk, supra note 51.
174. See supra notes 116-33 and accompanying text.
175. See Robert A. Bourque & Kerry L. Konrad, Avoiding Remote Jurisdiction
Based on Internet Web Site, 216 N.Y. L.J. 112 (1996) (Bourque was the attorney who
successfully defended King in Bensusan) ("The more interactive the site is, in other
words, the more it permits two-way communications with the remote user, the greater the
likelihood the site will be perceived as a purposeful entry into the remote jurisdiction.").
176. See supra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/4
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE 1NTERNET
defendants in these cases often had contracts,'7 and did a great deal of business
in the forums where they were found amenable to suit.1'7 Therefore, it made
sense to hold them amenable to suit in the forum states as the defendants knew
with whom they were dealing and where these persons were located.
Advertising is generally less interactive than formal business arrangements
and sales in the forum, as business is not always transacted. With the exception
of the Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.' decision, advertisements by
themselves did not make a defendant amenable to suit unless there was actual
solicitation in the forum.
80
When a claim is brought for tortious Internet contacts, the courts uniformly
have applied precedent used in publication cases, 8' and a finding of jurisdiction
is very likely.'82 The courts have decided that while free speech on the Internet
is important, the potential to spread misinformation and cause damage is great.83
Based on the current case law, clients who wish to avoid liability in distant
forums should limit their Internet activities in several ways. Sales opportunities
should be declined in forums in which a client wants to avoid jurisdiction.8 4 It
also would be wise for users to restrict access to their services, if possible, 85 to
control their liability.'86 In addition, as a preliminary matter, clients should find
out whether their potential Internet address could be considered to infringe on
a trademark in the particular forums in which the client intends to do business. 87
For lawyers retained after the contact has been made, and who are preparing
possible defenses in court against personal jurisdiction, there are two arguments
that the courts have indicated will not be likely to prevail. Generally, the defense
that a unilateral act of a person in the forum caused the contact by contacting a
website has proved ineffective in several different settings.'88 In addition, almost
every case analyzed in this note discussed the reasonableness factors set out in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,'89 and the argument
177. See supra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
179. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
180. See supra notes 54-75 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 116.
182. See supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
184. See Bourque, supra note 175.
185. Robert A. Bourque & Kerry L. Konrad, The Tangled Web: First Wave of
Internet Cases Provides More Questions Than Answers, 8 No. 11 J. PROPRIETARY RTs.
2, 5 (1996) (discussing the feasibility of limiting access to a website).
186. See Bourque, supra note 175.
187. See supra notes 54-75 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 91.
189. Asahi, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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was not successful in any of these cases. 9 The one defense that still seems to
be accepted by the courts is that customers of a service are unlikely to be haled
into a distant forum. 191
VI. CONCLUSION
Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc. 192 is the Eighth Circuit's first ruling on the
issue of how the traditional doctrines of personal jurisdiction should be applied
to Internet contact.' 93 The Maritz court's balancing of broad and narrow views
of personal jurisdiction provides a solid model of decision-making to be
followed by future courts. In addition, the principles set out in Maritz will lend
predictability to this area and allow attorneys to advise their clients on the
jurisdictional ramifications of Internet activity.
SEAN M. FLOWER
190. See supra Section III.C.
191. See CompuServe, Inc. v Patterson, 89 F.3d at 1257, 1265 (6th. Cir. 1996);
Cendali, supra note 52, at 9.
192. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.),
reconsideration denied, 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
193. Id. at 1332.
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